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I. INTRODUCTION
In previous work, Professor Peter Gerhart has applied to American
tort law a theory, of social equality and responsibility, commonly asso-
ciated with the political theories of John Rawls and Immanuel Kant.1
In tort scholarship, this understanding is often associated with the
moniker “corrective justice.”  With qualifications I will develop here,2
I will use corrective justice as shorthand to refer to that general under-
standing here.
In Property Law and Social Morality, Professor Gerhart conducts
an exercise in legal cross-pollination. Gerhart uses corrective justice to
develop a theory of property.  He derives from corrective justice four
† Professor of Law, George Mason University.  A.B. Princeton University, J.D.
University of Southern California.
1. PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 74–101 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2013).
2. See infra Part III.
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corollaries especially relevant for property: (1) owners are constrained
decision makers; (2) owner decision-making power is constrained by
community norms of recognition; (3) that power is also constrained by
a (community-recognized) norm to be other-regarding; and (4) other-
regarding decisions appropriately assign the burdens and benefits of
resource use.3  To illustrate both his understanding of corrective jus-
tice and these four corollaries, Gerhart applies them all to trespass,
nuisance, cotenancies, future interests, and various issues related to
regulation and eminent domain.
Property Law and Social Morality provides a good example for
studying whether philosophical tort theory can shed helpful light on
property law or philosophy. Among different subfields of “law and
philosophy,” philosophical tort scholarship is particularly distin-
guished in quality and maturity.4  The understanding of corrective jus-
tice on which Gerhart relies falls comfortably in one of the main
streams of philosophical tort scholarship on that topic.  Since tort re-
lates so closely to property,5 it is reasonable to wonder whether tort
insights on equality-and social-responsibility-based corrective justice
can shed light on property.6 Since Kantian and Rawlsian corrective
justice has stimulated excellent thinking about rights in torts, it is just
as reasonable to wonder whether it may pollinate rights-based schol-
arship about property.  Some private law theorists (notably, Canadian
tort theorists) have explored these possibilities.7
Property Law and Social Morality explores these possibilities fur-
ther, and the book’s insights repay careful study.  There is a well-worn
trope according to which a book reviewer gives a book two cheers but
not three.  With apologies to readers—and especially to Professor
Gerhart—I will use that trope here.
Cheer one: Property Law and Social Morality portrays individual
property rights and communal responsibilities in a nice balance.  In
property scholarship, scholars tend to be familiar with libertarian the-
ories of rights and communitarian theories of obligations.  In contrast
with both, corrective justice portrays justice as maintaining a commu-
nity in which individuals (on one hand) enjoy equal spheres of free-
dom but (on the other hand) are made responsible for the harms that
3. PETER GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 61 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2013); see id. at 46–61.
4. See JOHN OBERDIEK, INTRODUCTION: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 1 (John Oberdiek ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2493785.
5. Along with contract and unjust enrichment, tort and property mark off two of
the four most fundamental fields of private law.
6. See, e.g., Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 131 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
7. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992); AR-
THUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
66–68, 86–106 (2009).
2015] PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 207
their exercise of that freedom inflicts on the equal rights of others.
This equality-and social-responsibility-based portrait is much more
balanced than libertarian and communitarian alternatives.
Cheer two: Insights from corrective justice shed light on important
topics in property law and theory.  I find particularly illuminating Ger-
hart’s account of social recognition.  If a theory of property is
grounded in individual rights, Gerhart explains, the rights must be
structured so that a wide range of individuals can understand them
and why they deserve protection.  The rights must also be structured
in a manner that runs with community expectations and conventions
about why property is worth protecting, and what responsibilities run
with ownership. Although these constraints may sound straightfor-
ward, they impose limitations on property that are often overlooked.
Although Gerhart derives social recognition constraints from moral
principles associated with corrective justice, his insights about social
recognition should be of interest to a wide range of property theo-
rists—not only rights-based theorists, but also economic theorists.
No third cheer is forthcoming because Professor Gerhart and I
probably disagree about the extent to which corrective justice can jus-
tify a system of property.  Corrective justice (in the usage on which
Gerhart relies) emphasizes considerations about equal freedom and
respect.  I think these considerations constrain the structure of moral
rights.  I recognize that they are necessary elements of any fully satis-
fying account of rights.  In my opinion, however, equal freedom and
respect are not the most fundamental elements in a satisfying moral
account of rights; I prefer foundations resting on the low, solid, com-
mon-denominator components of human flourishing. But I hope that
disagreement remains a friendly one.  There is little enough American
scholarship on the rights-based foundations of property law. Many of
the lessons from Property Law and Social Morality seem compatible
with and relevant to any moral theory of property.
In this Review, I hope to critique specific parts of Property Law and
Social Morality that fairly represent these various reactions.  In Part I,
I explain the basis for my first cheer, and situate Property Law and
Social Morality in relation to other prominent moral theories of prop-
erty.  In Part II, I study one representative example confirming my
second cheer about Gerhart’s cross-pollination experiment—his cri-
tique of economic “evolutionary” or “Demsetzian” accounts of prop-
erty in chapter 4.8  In Part III, I offer what I hope is a friendly
amendment to Property Law and Social Morality, to clarify several
possible confusions about the scope of “corrective justice.” In Part IV,
I turn to my friendly disagreements.
8. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967).
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II. BALANCING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Property Law and Social Morality strikes a nice balance between
the rights and the responsibilities associated with property.  That bal-
ance has not always been respected in other, prominent justice-based
work on property.
Some prominent rights-based works have accentuated the right and
obfuscated the responsibility in property.  The poster example for this
tendency is Robert Nozick’s “historical entitlement” theory of rights
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.9  This theory has been restated fairly as
follows: “[A]s long as two conditions are satisfied—justice in acquisi-
tion (first possession) and justice in transfer (voluntary exchange)–the
current distribution of property is just.”10
This approach may be challenged on the ground that it overstates
the right and understates the limitations and the responsibilities asso-
ciated with property.11  But those challenges may be taken too far as
well.  Some scholars have suggested that contemporary law is as indi-
vidualistic as Nozick’s theory, or they have assumed that all theories
of rights are as individualistic as Nozick’s.  Those scholars then pre-
sent a false choice: If a rights-based theory of property entitles rights-
holders to disregard the interests of others, then the only acceptable
justice-based theory of property must emphasize property’s social re-
sponsibilities or functions.12
There has to be a middle ground.  For my part, I am sympathetic to
flourishing-based theories of property.  I believe that a flourishing- or
virtue-based “normative interest lies at the core” of property, “and
the rights and correlative duties follow from the interest.”13  Although
Property Law and Social Morality focuses on different aspects of so-
cial morality, its approach still occupies the same “centrist” ground.14
For Gerhart, “society” consists of many related individuals all pur-
suing their own individual life plans together.  Each person deserves
rights to pursue her own plans, but the rights have to be recognizable
by all and they have to be structured as likely to give other society
members equal opportunities to pursue their own life plans.  As Ger-
hart explains, “Theories of corrective justice knit individual rights and
community rights together because corrective justice understands the
9. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA  151 (2013).
10. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS
459, 498 (2010).
11. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROP-
ERTY (1992).
12. Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, Introduction to Symposium, The Social
Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (2011);
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
13. Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 889, 923 (2009).
14. GERHART, supra note 3, at 35.
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correlativity of rights and duties and therefore the obligations that
each individual in a community owes to every other individual, and to
the community, when individuals interact.”15  Although this insight
may seem true or even tautological, not all contemporary scholars ac-
cept it.  Some contemporary theories of justice continue to suggest
that a system of rights cannot be just unless it has a communitarian
tilt.  It cannot be repeated often enough that, in many serious theories
of rights, “rights and responsibilities over resources emanate from
shared values, not from opposing forces.”16
III. SOCIAL RECOGNITION
As the last Part should have made clear, in justice-based theories of
property, it is easy and tempting to focus on the two extremes in cor-
relative obligations—either the rights or the duties.  But this tempta-
tion can and should be avoided.  Another strategy is to start
somewhere in the middle.  Both rights and duties must be structured
to apply to a wide range of individuals who have different life needs,
starting positions, limitations, and goals.  In other words, even if peo-
ple intend to use the same resources or freedom to pursue different
life goals, equality and different uses limit the structure of the social
and legal rights covering these resources.  Equality and use differences
force conventional rights to be a lot more homogenous than the indi-
vidual uses people seek to make of the protected resources. At least as
important, conventional rights and duties must be made accessible to
the community members expected to respect the rights and obey the
duties.  In practice, the best way to make these rights and duties acces-
sible is to make them run with commonly shared pre-legal expecta-
tions and norms.
Property Law and Social Morality studies that imperative and de-
rives several interesting lessons.  Consider Professor Gerhart’s con-
cept of “social recognition.”  Social recognition refers to a constraint
on property rights and obligations: Both emerge “because, and to the
extent that, the community, or a large proportion of the community,
recognizes the justness of the claims of possession, labor, or other at-
tributes of ownership.”17  Similar lessons can come from economic ac-
counts of information costs,18 or from disciplines (like sociology or
linguistics) focusing more on how communication orders human af-
15. Id. at 26.
16. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 74.
18. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
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fairs.19  But it helps to study how social-recognition-based constraints
work with a theory of justice and rights.20
Law implicates in practice very basic questions raised in political
philosophy—about legitimate authority.  Laws coerce community
members to perform some actions they might otherwise be free to
decline to participate in, and they coerce members to refrain from
some actions they might otherwise be free to engage in.  Either way,
the community imposes on the individual a fixed course of conduct,
and it restrains what otherwise would be the general freedom of the
individual.  If individual freedom has any value, the community needs
to articulate why it has legitimate authority to make that imposition.
Social-recognition principles help answer questions about legitimate
authority.  Although individual freedom has value, many otherwise-
legitimate exercises of freedom may harm others or prevent them
from exercising similar freedom themselves.  The state has legitimate
authority from preventing individuals from exercising more discretion
in pursuing their own affairs than is consistent with all community
members’ enjoying similar discretion.  The state then has authority to
define tolerably clear zones of freedom that reflect in positive law
good-faith approximations of the equal zones of freedom to which all
community members are entitled in principle.  But those positive-law
zones of freedom are not likely to be enforceable unless community
members can recognize them easily and find them just—i.e., unless
they accord with social-recognition constraints.  Here, Gerhart illus-
trates nicely with many aspects of nuisance law.  Locality principles
stop plaintiffs from complaining about dominant local land uses when
their own uses are idiosyncratic in their neighborhoods,21 and the ex-
tra-sensitive plaintiff rule and other similar rules leave “special room
in the law of nuisance for cases in which the plaintiff ought, out of a
spirit of neighborliness, to absorb the social cost of being a
neighbor.”22
Moreover, by focusing on how social-recognition norms interact
with philosophical theories of property, property scholars may learn
more about non-philosophical theories they might otherwise take for
granted.  Here, Professor Gerhart makes an important contribution in
Chapter 4 of Property Law and Social Responsibility.  This chapter
sets out as a foil economic, evolutionary accounts of the genesis of
property rights—for short, “Demsetzian” accounts of property.23
19. See, e.g., CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION (1994).
20. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); J.W. HARRIS, PROP-
ERTY AND JUSTICE (1996).
21. GERHART, supra note 3, at 202–03.
22. Id. at 206.
23. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967); see also James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property
Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Dem-
setz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331 (2002). This
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Demsetzian accounts explain and justify conventional property rights
as solutions to an externality problem.  Administratively, property sys-
tems are expensive to run.  When a resource does not generate high
positive or negative externalities, the administrative costs of property
overwhelm property’s advantages.  As resources generate higher-
value uses (due to innovation, or scarcity, or other factors), the social
benefits of property overtake the administrative costs.
Demsetzian, evolutionary accounts of property formation resemble
evolutionary accounts of other developments in private law—includ-
ing economic accounts of the geneses of strict-liability and negligence
rules as responses to accident liability in torts.  Those latter, tort-based
evolutionary accounts have come under philosophical criticism.  Such
accounts claim that “the outcome of efficiency is the function of tort
law, even though efficiency was not part of the intentions of the devel-
opers, and remains alien to the intentions of the bulk of its contempo-
rary participants.”  Such accounts leave a mismatch—between the
intentions of officials making and administering the law and the net
effects of their official decisions.  But “[i]f a practice or institution re-
ally is to be explained by an outcome that lies outside the intentions of
those who have developed and maintained it, then a particular kind of
causal relationship must be shown,” and such a relationship has not
yet been shown for accident liability.24
Demsetzian accounts of property rights suffer from similar criti-
cisms. As far as I am aware, Gerhart is the first scholar to notice and
explore such criticism at length.25  As he frames the challenge, “the
evolution of private property begs the issue of how a community that
cannot coordinate the management of common property is able to co-
ordinate successfully to develop a system of private property.”26 (P.
74.)  Demsetz cited transitions in property rights in land among fur-
trading Montaigne Indians.27  If the Montaignes could not make an
open-access regime work, how could they cooperate well enough to
transition to a regime of private land?  And if efficiency gains are sup-
posed to justify the transition, is there any evidence suggesting that
is as good a place as any to lodge one other criticism of PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL
MORALITY: The end materials leave a bit to be desired.  In the list of references,
Merrill’s article is cited as starting on p. 331.  In fact, the article was published in a
supplemental issue with “S” pagination, so the article started on p. S331.  The list of
references list Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, but the index doesn’t have a reference for
the author or work, just references to specific Rawlsian topics like the veil of
ignorance.
24. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 25–26 (2001); see also Ste-
phen R. Perry, Method and Principle in Legal Theory, 111 YALE L.J. 1757, 1761–70
(2002) (book review critiquing the success and limitations of Coleman’s critique).
25. This gap was noted in Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A
Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 133, 133–34,
138–40 (2012).
26. GERHART, supra note 3, at 74.
27. Demsetz, supra note 8, at 351–52.
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the Montaignes justified the transition on the ground that it promoted
efficiency?
Property Law and Social Morality supplies reasonable answers to
these questions.  It helps “complete[ ] the economic theory of evolu-
tion[,] by making explicit that claims to property are accepted on the
basis of shared value formation.”28  As Gerhart rightly observes,
Demsetz’s account of the Montaigne Indians “hid . . . assumptions”
about how the Montaignes understood property and the social net-
works associated with property.29  The Montaignes must have shared
common values, specifying when it was justifiable to claim exclusive
ownership in land and when it was appropriate to insist that land was
better held in open access.  These values were binding in part because
they were commonly held, and in part because they justified both
forms of property (exclusive and open access) back to the normative
interests (in using things to survive, to better one’s life, or to produce
life conveniences) that justify property rights.  Through trial and error,
individual Montaignes must have challenged older consensuses in
favor of open access, and argued that a regime of exclusive land own-
ership better secured community goals.  It is reasonable to believe
that “many claims failed to be acceptable to those excluded,” that “vi-
olence was a necessary part of norm formulation,” but that “[s]lowly
the claims were made and accepted, and the threat of violence was
replaced by a norm of recognition.  That completes the causative story
that Demsetz omitted.”30
IV. HOW DO CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE RELATE
TO EACH OTHER?
Yet cross-pollination has downsides as well as upsides, and I worry
that Property Law and Social Morality suffers from one of the former.
“Corrective justice” means many different things in different contexts.
I think I understand the usage Gerhart assumes and applies, but I also
suspect that this usage may not be the usages most familiar to Ameri-
can property scholars.  (In Gerhart’s terms, maybe property scholars
follow social-recognition norms different from the ones that hold
among tort scholars!)  In this Part, I would like to flag a couple of
possible translation problems, specify why I think Property Law and
Social Morality is impliedly meant to avoid them, and suggest a couple
of friendly amendments to make these implied reservations explicit.
A. Two Usages of Corrective Justice in Tort
One source of possible confusion comes from tort scholarship itself.
Within tort scholarship, although different usages of “corrective jus-
28. GERHART, supra note 3, at 75.
29. Id. at 98.
30. Id.
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tice” may be sorted in different ways, for our purposes these usages
may be sorted as falling along a continuum with two extremes.  Ger-
hart draws on usages falling toward one extreme, which I will call the
“substantive” approach to corrective justice.  In this approach, “cor-
rective justice” has substantive content; it can offer determinate and
direct prescriptions about specific, substantive questions of rights and
duties in a given recurring dispute. Gerhart’s four main principles are
representative of such prescriptions.
At the other extreme end fall what I’ll call here “remedial” under-
standings of corrective justice.  In remedial usages, citizens have moral
responsibilities not to wrong their neighbors or their neighbors’ rights.
Those responsibilities follow from primary duties that a community
institutes to implement principles of justice unqualified and writ large
(here, “general justice”31).  To determine what general justice re-
quires, decision makers must reason about equality, responsibility, re-
spect, and many other salient considerations. Corrective justice comes
into the picture only after a wrongdoer violates a primary duty estab-
lished as a matter of general justice.  When a primary duty is violated,
the wrongdoer is obligated to erase and repair to the extent possible
the bad effects of the primary wrong.  The remedial understanding of
corrective justice refers to this secondary duty to remedy the primary
wrong.32
To illustrate both, consider with a case Gerhart covers briefly, Fon-
tainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. The Fontaine-
bleau Hotel Corporation built an additional tower on its property, and
the new tower blocked light to the cabana and swimming pool of the
Eden Roc hotel. The owners of the Eden Roc complained (among
other things) that the tower addition inflicted a nuisance on the Eden
Roc; the Florida appellate court held there was no nuisance. “[I]n the
absence of some contractual or statutory obligation,” the court in-
sisted, there is “no legal right to the free flow of light and air from the
adjoining land.”33
In tort-based terms, in Fontainebleau the court of appeals needed to
decide whether the managers of the Fontainebleau hotel had commit-
ted a nuisance—a wrong—to the proprietors of the Eden Roc hotel.
In property-based terms, though, the case forced the court of appeals
to lay down a precedent specifying the contours of Floridian land
owners’ possessory interests in controlling, using, and enjoying land.
Those interests could have been specified into two different packages
31. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTS 164–65 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 2d ed. 2011).
32. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL
THEORY 293, 305 (2012) see John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part I—The Place
of Corrective Justice, 30 L. & Phil. 1, 21 (2011); Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice
and Property Rights, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 124 (1994).
33. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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of specific use-interests.  The content of those two packages can be
described using Hohfeldian terminology.34   One package creates an
“exclusion” regime.35   In this regime, the relevant rights and responsi-
bilities are built around land boundaries and notions of harm associ-
ated with physical, trespassory entries. Light generates no specific
property rights or responsibilities because photons do not generate
physical trespasses.  Thus, in the exclusion regime, all land owners are
entitled to liberties (Hohfeldian privileges) to build extra stories on
their buildings without considering the impact on neighbors.  If all
owners hold such liberties, every owner also holds correlative expo-
sures (no-rights)—against the possibility that her neighbors may exer-
cise the same liberty on their own lots.
The other package creates an “access to light” regime.  In this pack-
age, sunlight is a resource valuable enough to override all the policies
(simplicity, clarity, and so forth) that ordinarily justify the exclusion
approach.  Thus, in the access to light approach, land owners owe du-
ties not to build additions without considering certain effects on their
neighbors.  In so, those owners also hold correlative rights, to enjoin
their neighbors from exercising what would otherwise be liberties to
build additions with the proscribed effects.
Gerhart believes that the exclusion package is preferable to the ac-
cess to light package.36  I agree, though with reservations to be ex-
plained in Part V.  For the time being, I have an analytical question:
To what extent does this substantive choice sound in corrective jus-
tice?  Gerhart uses Fontainebleau to illustrate how Rawlsian veil-of-
ignorance principles work.37  The veil of ignorance is relevant because
it implements a strategy whereby nuisance “assess[es] the decisions
made by each neighbor in light of what each neighbor should have
understood about the decisions (past, present, and future) of other
neighbors (assuming that the other neighbors will make reasonable
decisions”38)  That strategy is required by Gerhart’s four starting prin-
ciples, which all implement a broad, substantive understanding of cor-
rective justice. If corrective justice is merely remedial, however, this
train of reasoning never leaves the station.
B. Corrective Justice and Distributive Justice in
Property Scholarship
The other translation difficulty arises not from multiple usages in
tort scholarship but rather from a rival usage familiar in property
34. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30–58 (1913).
35. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Verses Governance: Two Strategies for Delineat-
ing Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453 (2002).
36. GERHART, supra note 3, at 210.
37. See id. at 208–10.
38. Id. at 192.
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scholarship. Many property scholars associate “corrective justice”
with Robert Nozick’s justification and Richard Epstein’s early justifi-
cation for property, and they may resist theories associated with
Nozick and Epstein’s work.
Many property scholars place great value in distributive justice, spe-
cifically distributive justice understood as “call[ing] on the state to
guarantee that property is distributed throughout society so that eve-
ryone is supplied with a certain level of material means.”39  The wide
admiration and influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice con-
firms as much.40
Nozick wrote Anarchy, State, and Utopia in large part to respond to
and supply a significant theoretical alternative to A Theory of Jus-
tice.41  Although Nozick himself did not describe his alternative as a
theory of corrective justice, he came close.  Nozick developed an “en-
titlement” theory of justice, by which he meant that people deserve to
retain holdings they acquire originally or acquire by transfer from
someone else who acquires them originally.42  This entitlement theory
makes holdings not susceptible to reordering on the basis of context-
specific desert criteria of members of a community.  That characteris-
tic makes Nozick’s entitlement theory “historical”—in opposition to
Rawls’s theory, which makes “patterned” prescriptions of justice.43
Even if Nozick did not rely primarily on corrective justice to ground
his entitlement theory, it is understandable why that theory is associ-
ated with corrective justice.  If one of the state’s main goals is to pro-
tect legitimate entitlements, one of the state’s main functions is to
oversee “the rectification of injustice in holdings.”44  For scholars who
prize distributive justice, then, “corrective justice” seems to refer to an
understanding of justice according to which existing entitlements are
legitimate.  Corrective justice also seems to leave the state with little
discretion to reorder such entitlements consistent with distributive,
patterned, and (usually) need-based principles of justice.
These reactions are fairly illustrated with State v. Shack and other
migrant worker cases.  In Shack, a government-funded caseworker
39. SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 4
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2004).
40. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press, Rev.
ed., 1971); see also Symposium, Rawls and the Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1381
(2004). As proof, consider how Thomas W. Merrill uses (and criticizes) distributive
justice in Wealth and Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 489 (1990) (book review).
41. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 9, at 183 (praising A THEORY OF JUSTICE as a
“powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philoso-
phy which has not seen it’s like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then”).
42. See id. at 150–52.
43. See id. at 153–64.
44. Id. at 152; see also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and
Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses
and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974);
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
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and a Legal Services Corporation attorney wanted to meet a migrant
worker housed in a camp on the grounds of the farmer employing
him.  The farmer refused the caseworker and attorney permission to
enter but offered to notify the worker that they wanted to meet him;
the caseworker and attorney entered the farmer’s land anyway.  The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that migrant-residents were entitled
to invite social-service workers, members of the press, and other visi-
tors of their choosing as long as visitors behaved reasonably.45
Gerhart reads Shack as enforcing principles of equality, respect, and
social obligation.46 This interpretation has some support in some
passages of Shack. When Chief Justice Weintraub says, “Title to real
property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the
owner permits to come upon the premises,” he could be interpreted as
making claims about equal freedom and respect characteristic of sub-
stantive corrective justice.47  I disagree with this justification for
Shack’s result, for reasons I have set forth elsewhere.48  Here, how-
ever, I want to focus on Shack because it provides one of the clearest
examples in core property doctrine of distributive justice in the sense
being discussed.   Distributive justice in this sense is implemented
most often in public law schemes redistributing private property—es-
pecially progressive taxation and public-assistance programs. Shack
gets prominence among property scholars because it provides an un-
usually clear example in which the same distributive commitments are
used to structure property rights from the inside, within property
law.49
To such scholars, Shack seems better justified as an application of
distributive justice: “Here we are concerned with a highly disadvan-
taged segment of our society.”50  More generally, to scholars who
value distributive justice, it may seem confusing or threatening to rein-
troduce to property corrective justice in any form—because any such
project may be a Trojan Horse for Nozickean corrective justice.
Hence a second analytical question: To what extent is the result in
Shack required by corrective justice, and not distributive justice or
some other form of justice?
C. On the Right Relations Between Corrective and
Distributive Justice
These questions tread on a treacherously difficult topic—the rela-
tions between corrective justice, distributive justice, and general jus-
45. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971).
46. GERHART, supra note 3, at 170–71.
47. Shack, 277 A.2d at 372.
48. Claeys, supra note 13, at 939–46.
49. See JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES xi
(5th ed., 2010) (quoting from Shack for the epigraph).
50. Id.
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tice.  There are ambiguities between these three fields, as one can see
just by looking at Aristotle’s seminal definition of corrective justice: a
“form of justice . . . that sets things straight in transactions. . .. For it
makes no difference whether a decent person cheated someone of a
low sort, or a low sort of person cheated a decent one. . . but the law
looks only to the difference arising from the harm.”51  Does the form
of justice that sets things straight also encompass the substantive prin-
ciples that determine how things should be laid when they are straight,
or are these two separate domains of justice?
The same ambiguity is also evident in common sense reasoning and
basic legal practice.  For a variety of reasons, it makes practical sense
for groups and legal systems to defer the work of specifying substan-
tive rights until two parties care enough to force a settlement whether
one is wronging the other. Fontainebleau sets an important precedent
about the scope of the possessory interest in using land, but it does so
in a tort suit. Shack limits the substantive interest in control and en-
larges the substantive interest of a resident-licensee, but it makes both
of these declarations in a criminal prosecution.  Do the property-spec-
ifying parts of these cases sound in corrective justice (or, since Shack
is a criminal case, maybe retributive justice), or a separate domain of
justice?52
These boundary issues get more complicated because the meaning
of the term “distributive justice” has evolved over the last several cen-
turies.  Aristotle defined distributive justice as “that which is involved
in distributions of honor or money, or as many other things as are
divisible, among those who share in the political community.”  As Sa-
muel Fleischacker has helpfully recounted, since the early nineteenth
century, distributive justice has gradually developed into a goal of
guaranteeing that all citizens have adequate resources for survival and
improvement regardless of their life stations.   “[T]he ancient princi-
ple” of distributive justice “has to do with distribution according to
merit,” Fleischacker explains, “while the modern principle demands a
distribution independent of merit.”53   These are two possible usages
but not the only two.  Distributive justice might focus not on the dis-
tribution of honor to a few, or the distribution of material resources to
all, but on the distribution of rights—i.e., general and impersonal
spheres of opportunity by which all can work and acquire and use
resources to fulfill their own life goals.54
51. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, chs. 2, 4, at 83, 85–86 (Albert Keith
Whitaker ed., Joe Sachs trans., Focus Publishing 2002).
52. See Eric R. Claeys, On the “Property” and the “Tort” in Trespass, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 122, 124–25 (John Oberdiek ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2014); see also Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13
GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
53. FLEISCHACKER, supra note 39, at 5.
54. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 31, at 165–66.
218 TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROPERTY LAW [Vol. 2
There are at least three ways to resolve these ambiguities.  One is to
make corrective and distributive justice track the basic examples Aris-
totle used.  In this solution, corrective justice covers both the wrong-
rectifying and the substantive-rights-specifying aspects of disputes
about personal wrongs, breaches of contract, or disputes about prop-
erty.  By contrast, distributive justice involves situations in which a
people or its government makes discretionary awards of honor or
honor-like goods to individual citizens.55
Another approach is to construe corrective justice narrowly and dis-
tributive justice broadly.  In this view, corrective justice is limited to
its remedial functions.  Distributive justice of justice structures the
rights of bodily autonomy, contract, and property wronged in each
respective case.56
The two preceding views assume that corrective and distributive jus-
tice exhaust the coverage of general justice.57  A third approach re-
jects this assumption.  As in the second view, corrective justice creates
wrongs and obligations to repair wrongs; unlike the second view, some
subdomain of justice that is neither distributive nor corrective explains
why substantive rights of bodily autonomy, contract, liberty to com-
pete, reputation, property, and so forth are structured as they are.58
D. On Corrective and Distributive Justice in Property Law and
Social Morality
In his argument, Professor Gerhart doesn’t adequately anticipate or
bracket these questions.  These criticisms detract significantly from
Property Law and Social Morality, but some readers would have been
spared some confusion if these questions had been anticipated.
In that spirit, I offer two friendly amendments to and clarifications
of Gerhart’s project.  First, Property Law and Social Morality’s basic
argument stands whether or not one agrees that its interpretive frame-
work is a “corrective justice” framework.  Debates about the spheres
of corrective, distributive, and general justice are important, but they
are analytical, and distinct from the implications Gerhart draws out.
55. See FLEISCHACKER, supra note 39, at 13–15, 20–21; see, e.g., Peter Benson, The
Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515
(1992).
56. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 348–54 (1992);
W.J.WALUCHOW, PROFESSOR WEINREB ON CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, in Justice Law and
Method in Plato and Aristotle, (ed. Spiro Panogiatou) 153, 155–56 (1987). Finnis ad-
mits this possibility, Natural Law & Natural Rights, pp. 169–74, but he assumes that
particular legal transactions raise not only distributive issues but also corrective (he
would say “commutative” issues). Id. at 179–84.
57. See FINNIS, supra note 31, at 164–67 (Finnis portrays justice in this fashion).
58. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 32, at 8; Dennis Klimchuk, On the Autonomy of
Corrective Justice, 23 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 49 (2003); Stephen Perry, On the Rela-
tionship between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE, 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., Series No. 4, 2000).
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The principles animating Gerhart’s project are equality and human
agency.  Free moral agents deserve equal freedom and opportunities
to set and act on their own life goals, and the principles that entitle
them to such freedom and agency impose on them responsibilities to
respect fellow community members’ similar freedom and agency.  Al-
though these principles are often associated with substantive correc-
tive justice, they aren’t necessarily or logically intertwined with
corrective justice.  Indeed, much of the corrective justice scholarship
makes this clear. For example, in some accounts, corrective justice is
portrayed as desirable not in and of itself but as an implication of a
more fundamental Kantian theory of equal right.59
Normative principles of equality and agency can be attractive and
relevant to a theory of property regardless of how the reader pige-
onholes them in different taxonomies of justice. Assume that correc-
tive justice and distributive justice are both understood narrowly, in
the third possibility outlined above.  Even so, in general justice, it mat-
ters very much that community members have equal opportunities to
acquire and use resources for different reasonable life goals.  The sub-
stantive policy choices lurking in a case like Fontainebleau stay the
same; they just migrate from corrective justice to general justice.  By
contrast, in the second possibility outlined above, the veil of ignorance
analysis that Gerhart conducts as a matter of corrective justice instead
becomes an application of distributive justice.  Justice requires distri-
butions of rights and responsibilities likely to give landowners equal
opportunities to use their own land and equal responsibility for the
effects of their uses on others.  Property law is the forum where these
distributive choices are made and implemented, while tort law pro-
vides the forum where violations of the distributions are corrected.
As long as principles of equal freedom and responsibility are internal-
ized in the process, it’s not important to Gerhart’s project whether
those principles are applied in the course of distributive or corrective
reasoning.
Revisions like these do not obviously deal with distributive justice
in its modern sense.  My second suggestion: Property Law and Social
Morality’s project makes sense as long as understood within reasona-
ble limits.  Even if one believes that a system of property should facili-
tate equal access to material resources, it does not follow that every
institution in a legal system has to guarantee equal access to those
resources.  Even in a political system in which fair distribution is valu-
able, individual freedom and social prosperity can both be valuable as
well.  Some legal and political institutions can focus on securing free-
dom and prosperity.  Moreover, if increasing prosperity is broad-
based, it can lessen the need for targeted redistribution.
59. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS  433; see, e.g., ERNEST J.
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 84–144 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1995).
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Professor Gerhart focuses on property doctrines—land-use torts,
cotenancies, and government police and eminent domain powers—
that happen to be particularly fundamental and basic.  These doctrines
secure and order freedom.  Although there are empirical questions, it
is at least reasonable to assume that these doctrines take an indirect
but at least somewhat-effective first cut at enlarging prosperity and
satisfying many individual needs.  If these doctrines leave residual ine-
qualities, those inequalities may be covered in other property-related
doctrines, or in related fields like tax or public-assistance policy. Prop-
erty Law and Social Morality doesn’t need to cover every property
doctrine or every distributive problem to succeed within its own limits.
Readers merely need to have clarified what those limits are.
V. HOW IMPORTANT IS FLOURISHING TO CORRECTIVE
JUSTICE OR RIGHTS?
Let me turn from my friendly amendments to my disagreement.
With Gerhart, I certainly agree that equal freedom, and respect for
the consequences of one’s agency on others, are two important goals
of and constraints on a system of private law.  But I also doubt that
these values give as much determinate guidance to law as Property
Law and Social Morality.
A. The Priorities of Equality, Responsibility, Rights—
and Flourishing
Because I have developed these themes elsewhere,60 I will restate
my preferred approach here in extremely compressed form.   Political
and legal rights are grounded most solidly in people’s interests in pur-
suing their own flourishing—their happiness understood rationally.
Yet, even though happiness is an objective phenomenon, in ordinary
social and political life most people are bad judges of others’ happi-
nesses.  This disjunction is especially pronounced in large modern na-
tion-states.  In such states, citizens have few linguistic, cultural, ethnic,
religious, or other common ties.  Because they have hardly any direct
interactions with most fellow citizens, they have no way to know the
backgrounds, characters, needs, or genuine interests of fellow citizens.
In such conditions, the most realistic, least controversial, and most
humane way to promote flourishing is not to use law to promote flour-
ishing directly but to do so indirectly.   Well-ordered political and legal
rights can give citizens broad zones of non-interference.  Citizens may
reasonably be expected to use these rights to pursue at least the low
and solid preconditions of their flourishing—survival, health, accom-
modation, safety, and prosperity—and the most common and uncon-
60. See Claeys, supra note 13, at 916–34; Eric R. Claeys, The Private Society and
the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 201 (2008).
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troversial forms of flourishing—particularly the goods associated with
family, private friendships, and self-governance in small associations.
From those starting premises, the principles Gerhart associates with
corrective justice state important, even necessary, constraints on
moral rights.61  Even if citizens need broad spheres of liberty to pur-
sue their own understandings of flourishing, they all participate in a
common political enterprise, in which all citizens enjoy a state of
“Equality, where in all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another.”62  But equality, power, jurisdiction, reci-
procity, and other terms have to be understood in reference to the
different forms of flourishing community members practice in public
and private.  As a result, in revealing cases, the legal system has to
clarify how equal rights and responsibilities relate to flourishing.
B. Private Law: Establishing Basic Property Rights
Professor Gerhart illustrates his approach using doctrines of tres-
pass and nuisance.  These are excellent starting doctrines, because
they63 supply the first and most basic level of ordering in American
private law.  Here, too, Fontainebleau provides an excellent point of
contrast between Professor Gerhart’s and my approaches to basic
property torts.
In Gerhart’s opinion, behind the veil of ignorance, most (reasona-
ble) local land owners would prefer freedom to develop and use land
actively over freedom to enjoy quiet uses of land enhanced with extra
sunlight.64 True, to an extent, equality-based concerns help justify us-
ing the veil of ignorance; owners must accept a legal rule in which they
swallow the bitter with the sweet.  Under the access-to-light package,
owners get a claim-right against light blockages, but by implication
from the logic of equal rights, they owe neighbors correlative duties
not to block light to their lots.  Under the exclusion package, owners
have a liberty to build light-blocking edifices, but they also are subject
to reciprocal exposures against the possibility that their neighbors will
build structures blocking light to their lots.  By itself, equality cannot
say which of these two packages is preferable.
Gerhart argues that people are not normally expected to consider
the impact of building on others’ light, neighbors can buy extra land,
and the access-to-light package is costly to administer.65 The claims
61. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS , supra, at 351.
62. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, at 269 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1960).
63. Along with other property-based tort doctrines.  Other relevant doctrines in-
clude the rules of strict liability and negligence made applicable to land, and parallel
doctrines for chattels (conversion, trespass to chattels, and negligence-related chattel
doctrines).
64. GERHART, supra note 3, at 209–10.
65. Id. at 210.
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about normal expectations are empirical but Gerhart offers no cita-
tions or empirics.  By and large, the argument seems instead to appeal
to intuitive reactions about how hypothetically-reasonable onlookers
would react behind the veil of ignorance.  I am not necessarily averse
to intuitive judgments; there is some truth and wisdom in the joke that
evidence is “good enough for government work.”  But Gerhart’s judg-
ment here, which seems representative of many judgments throughout
the book, seems underdetermined.  One cannot reason about which
package of use-interests is most just without having some sense how
and why owners use land.  That inquiry turns out to be difficult to
settle.  Some people like to use land for recreational or aesthetic uses;
they would prefer the access-to-light package.  Others like to use land
for many legitimate but active and utilitarian purposes; they would
prefer the exclusion package.
In my (similarly intuitive) judgment, the exclusion package seems
more just for two overlapping reasons.  First, if one were to catalog all
the possible legitimate land uses that owners might want to pursue,
intuitively, it seems likely that more of them are facilitated by the ex-
clusion package and restricted by the access-to-light package than the
other way around.  Second, and separately, the land uses facilitated by
exclusionary rights tend to facilitate more basic and solid forms of
human flourishing.  Some people like enjoying land passively; all peo-
ple need to occupy and engage with some land actively, to have a resi-
dence and carry on their lives.  If passive and active uses of land can’t
be reconciled with each other, in case of conflict better to err on the
side of facilitating the low, solid and active uses.
C. Private Law: Ordering Property Rights toward Flourishing
If basic property-tort doctrines supply the first layer of private or-
dering for property, a second level is provided in specialized doctrines
in contract and property.  Property law generates default rules for
property held in different communal arrangements, and contract law
can generate similar defaults when owners make relations with non-
owners.  In these fields as well, equal right and obligation shape and
inform the law—but flourishing seems another and more fundamental
influence.
Professor Gerhart spends two chapters on co-tenants, estates, and
future interests.66 His treatment of one issue of cotenancy law—
ouster—provides another fair point of contact.   Ordinarily, all coten-
ants hold concurrent liberties to use and enjoy a commonly-owned
premise, and none owes the other any profits from her own particular
use.  Yet any cotenant has a power to oust the others and establish
sole possession, provided that he account for his profits to the others
in proportion to their interests in the cotenancy.  Gerhart sees ouster
66. Id. at 215–46.
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as a “difficult issue” because nonpossessing owners are treated un-
equally.  After all, ouster deprives nonpossessing owners “of the in-
come-producing benefits of ownership but [forces them] to retain
their share of the burdens.”67
According to Professor Gerhart, ouster rules have two justifica-
tions. These rules clarify property relations, by making ousted tenants
make good faith claims for possession as a precondition for an ac-
counting, and they also free cotenants in possession from needing to
consider the interests of other cotenants except when those cotenants
make demands for exclusive possession.68 But neither justification ac-
counts for why any one cotenant is entitled to oust the others—in vio-
lation of equality between the cotenants.
Here, too, property rights and equality both get aligned to secure
interests in flourishing.  In a flourishing-based natural rights approach,
“Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direction
of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and prescribes no
farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law.”69  The
pre-ouster and ouster models both respect the equal rights and inter-
ests of cotenants—but they vary the legal rights to fit what can reason-
ably be presumed about the interests on the facts.  If all one knows is
that several co-owners share a co-tenancy, it makes sense to assume
that they would all like equal opportunities to use the premises.  That
is why ordinary cotenancy rules guarantee formally-equal rights of ac-
cess, use, and enjoyment.
In some situations, however, one or a few cotenants may be more
assertive and entrepreneurial than the others.  The law must continue
to presume that all of the cotenants continue to have some common
interest in remaining in the same association; any cotenant who didn’t
have such an interest could partition.  But the cotenants might have
different individual interests in the community.  In my own personal
experience, many associations operate on a model whereby a few ac-
tive and spirited members do most of the work, have most of the con-
trol, and get most of the credit, and the rest of the members get the
benefits of the association’s activities without doing the work.   It’s
perfectly reasonable to create a property institution enabling this
model for joint ownership of property.
In the ouster model, all of the cotenants have equal general norma-
tive interests in the commonly-owned premises, but one or a few have
a specific interest in the active use and control of the premises and the
rest have specific interests in the passive enjoyment of income or prof-
its.  The act of ouster is a rough but clear and symbolic proxy for those
different interests, and the exclusion-with-accounting model respects
67. Id. at 216–17.
68. Id. at 217.
69. LOCKE, supra note 62, at 305.
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both the retail differences and wholesale equality.  As in nuisance law,
though, the equal freedom and respect among the cotenants is one of
several factors shaping the law.  And what equality requires turns on
the cotenants’ flourishing-based interests in using the premises.
D. Public Law: Securing a Community of Equal Owners
The limits of an equality-based approach become most obvious
when one compares Professor Gerhart’s treatment of the private law
of property with his treatment of the corresponding public law.  For
this discrepancy, the clearest point of contact comes in Gerhart’s
treatments of trespass Kelo v. City of New London.  In Kelo, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a local development corporation didn’t vio-
late federal public use limitations by condemning private lots and as-
signing them to a commercial developer, not when the corporation
had a minimally-plausible basis for believing that the condemnations
were part of a broader local plan to increase economic development,
growth, and tax revenues.70
Ultimately, Gerhart believes that Kelo can be justified on the
ground that the government may apply public power to remedy likely
market failure.  Ordinarily, Gerhart assumes, government regulation
focuses on upholding the conditions of private ordering. But “[t]he
state has the power to replace market forces when, because of market
failures, the market cannot successfully coordinate decisions of dispa-
rate users.”71 “[W]hen owners are so few that they can raise their
prices above competitive levels, the property system is not functioning
as anticipated and the state is justified in intervening and re-delegat-
ing decision-making authority,”72 and Gerhart concludes that these
conditions were satisfied in Kelo.
This treatment of Kelo is hard to reconcile with Gerhart’s general
understanding of corrective justice, or with his treatment of parallel
doctrines in private law.  Those other contributions justify the pre-
sumption Gerhart applies to Kelo as a starting point: “Mrs. Kelo’s de-
cision to stay in her home, even as her neighborhood changed,
provides no justification, by intervening . . . to replace her as decision
maker for the property.”  Ordinarily, “an owner’s decisions [shouldn’t
be] second-guessed by the state, or even [be] capable of being second-
guessed by the state.”73
Gerhart cites market failure as a basis for departing from this pre-
sumption. Gerhart’s case for market failure hinges on a combination
of empirical judgment and normative assumptions. Gerhart and I
probably disagree about the empirical issues, but set those differences
70. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482–490 (2005).
71. GERHART, supra note 3, at 276.
72. Id. at 284.
73. Id. at 281.
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aside here.  Here, what’s revealing are the normative assumptions.
Any reasonable political theory has to justify some involuntary trans-
actions with property, but these justifications are difficult to make.74  I
doubt that, by themselves, principles of equal freedom and responsi-
bility for one’s actions on others can supply such a justification. I am
even more skeptical that such principles can generate any specific pre-
scriptions about whether it is desirable or undesirable for a govern-
ment to intervene to rectify market failures.  Gerhart’s position
probably hinges on unstated priors that political communities succeed
fairly often when they enact legislation aimed at market failures.
A flourishing-and rights-based approach confronts those issues
more directly.75 Again, two of the main justifications for a natural
rights-based approach are: (first) that groups tend to apprehend the
genuine interests of individuals less often than those individuals do
themselves; and (second) that, in a dispersed society groups often
have factious incentives to pursue the collective interests of the group
and not the true interests of the individuals affected by group policies.
Kelo confirmed both points to me when it was in court, and it seems to
confirm both points even more strongly now.
Kelo confirms that political processes can fail at least as badly as
market processes.76 New London officials had planned to assign large
tracts of land to a commercial developer called Corcoran Jennison.
Later, officials had to decertify the developer because it failed to meet
several financing benchmarks.  By December 2008, three and a half
years after Kelo was handed down, builders had started construction
on only one building, a museum.  While the Fort Trumbull project was
tied up in litigation and local political disputes, private developers
built office buildings and hotels outside the redevelopment area.  That
construction eliminated the need for offices and hotels called for in
the comprehensive plan.  In November 2009, Pfizer shut down its New
London plant and removed the anchor for the Fort Trumbull develop-
ment plan. In the words of investigative journalist Jeff Benedict,
“Over $100 million in taxpayer money has been spent there.  And
what do you have to show for it?  Dirt and weeds.”77
74. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980).
75. See Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004).
76. This Review relies on journalistic accounts of the Fort Trumbull project at is-
sue in Kelo, but my general argument has been developed considerably more exten-
sively in ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: Kelo v. City of New London and the
Limits of Eminent Domain (forthcoming 2015).
77. Chris Kilmer & Christina Caron, John Stossel on Eminent Domain Run Amok,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Stossel/story?id=699272
38& page=1; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Kathleen
Edgecomb, Deed Gives NL Building a New Address, THE DAY (New London, CT)
(Jan. 6, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.theday.com/article/20090106/DAYARC/30106996
8/0/search; Karin Crompton, NLDC Resumes Efforts To Move Ahead With Fort
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Separately, Kelo also illustrates how political processes can get co-
opted by factious groups. Corcoran Jennison received the Kelo plain-
tiffs’ properties on a ninety-nine-year lease for a dollar a year.  Suzette
Kelo and other homeowners were ousted as part of one of many
sweeteners (totaling up to $118 million in financial incentives) for the
Pfizer Corporation to build a pharmaceutical plant in New London.
When the New London project was approved by the New London
Development Corporation, the chair of the corporation was the wife
of a high-ranking Pfizer official.78  This dispute had class overtones as
well. As one former Connecticut state official explained, “[Pfizer offi-
cials] were trying to attract people with Ph.D.’s who make $150,000 to
$200,000 a year to eastern Connecticut . . . and they were not going to
tell them they had to drive to work through a blighted community.”79
In fact, the backlash against Kelo confirms Gerhart’s understanding
of equal freedom and social recognition as much as Kelo itself contra-
dicts that understanding. As Gerhart himself stresses, property is rec-
ognized not only in law but also in social morality.  A major
component of that morality is an expectation: “the state ordinarily
does not coerce individuals to give up their discrete property rights
unless they have done something wrong, such as default on a loan or
commit a crime.”80 Kelo has sparked unusual criticism and back-
lash—precisely because it offends the sorts of social-recognition
norms that Gerhart brings to our attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
By suggesting that Property Law and Social Morality’s theory has
limits, however, I don’t mean to suggest that the theory is fundamen-
tally flawed.  Any worthwhile theory applies in some contexts and not
others; this Review means only to show where a theory of equality
ceases to supply determinate prescriptions and other moral ap-
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proaches must carry forth. Property Law and Social Morality stimu-
lates discussion about rights-based approaches to property, and it does
a fine job bringing concerns about equality and corrective justice to
property law and theory.  We should be grateful to Professor Gerhart
for these contributions.
